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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
HEATHER HAll,

Docket No. 39473-2011

Plaintiff/Appellant,
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
vs.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, L.l.G. and KURTIS HOLT,
M.D., and RANDAll FOWLER, M.D., and
JEFF JOHNSON,
Defendants/Respondents.

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is a medical malpractice case involving allegations asserted by
Plaintiff/Appellant Heather Hall, hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff' orthe "patient." Plaintiff
appeals the October 25,2011 summary judgment decision of the Honorable David C. Nye
wherein he granted the Defendants/Respondents' motion for summary judgment on all
claims. Respondents contend the decision of the District Court should be affirmed in all
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 1

respects, because: 1) all of the patient's claims are subject to the requirements of Idaho
Code §6-1012; 2) the affidavit of the patient's expert, Dr. David Bowman, lacks foundation
and was therefore inadmissible pursuant to Rule 56 (e) because Dr. Bowman failed to set
forth in his affidavit that he had adequately familiarized himself with the standard of health
care practice applicable to any of the Respondents practicing in the emergency room
setting in Pocatello, Idaho in 2009; 3) the opinions expressed in Dr. Bowman's affidavit are
conclusory and not based on personal knowledge as they are improperly based on
unsupported allegations in the complaint; 4) Idaho Code § 54-1814 is inapplicable for use
by an expert opposing summary judgment in a civil suit for damages; and 5) the patient
failed to establish the existence of any statewide minimum standards regarding the proper
way to auscultate a patient's heart beat while evaluating complaints of chest pain and
migraine headache during an emergency room examination. Because the District Court
properly concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit fa iled to meet the admissibility req uirements
of Rule 56(e) and Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, the Court properly granted the
Respondents' motion for summary judgment on all counts.
B.

Course Of Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on May 3, 2011,
alleging claims for "Battery," "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress," "Invasion of
Privacy," "Negligent Supervision" and "Respondeat Superior." (R. p. 4-6). The parties
thereafter engaged in discovery after which the Defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. (R. p. 11-16). The defense motion was supported by the affidavits of Jeff
Johnson, P.A., Dr. Holt and Dr. Fowler In their affidavits, each of the Defendant health
care providers set forth their actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice
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applicable to each of them for the time and place in question. (R. p. 19-47). The affidavits
further state that the care and treatment of the Plaintiff by each of the Defendant health
care providers complied in all respects with the applicable local community standard of
health care practice for Pocatello, Idaho, in 2009. Id.
Plaintiff opposed the defense motion with the Affidavit of Dr. David Bowman,
an Idaho Falls, Idaho, physician of unknown specialty. (R. p. 71) Dr. Bowman claimed to
have familiarized himself with the local standard of health care practice based on his
experience, his review of the patient's medical records, his review of the complaint and
consultation with anonymous physicians. (R. p. 72-73).

Following oral argument on

September 26, 2011, the District Court concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit lacked
foundation and was therefore inadmissible, and thus the Plaintiff's showing was not
adequate, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defense on all claims. (R. p.
101-108). As part of the District Court's ruling, it found that all of Plaintiff's claims should
be treated together as a standard medical malpractice case. (R. p. 101).
Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration or submit a supplemental affidavit of Dr.
Bowman correcting the deficiencies identified by the District Court.

Instead, Plaintiff

subseq uently filed a Memorand um in Support of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under
Rule 59(a) on November 8, 2011; however, no motion was ever filed with the
memorandum. (R. p. 111). Without any further court action, on December 8,2011, Plaintiff
filed her Notice of Appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 17. (R. p. 115). The defense opposed
Plaintiffs procedurally improper Rule 59 (a) submission. (R. p. 121-26). The court heard
oral argument on December 19, 2011, after which the District Court affirmed summary
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judgment for the Defendants. 1 Plaintiff thereafter filed an Amended Notice of Appeal
pursuant to I. R.A. 17 on January 3, 2012. (R. p. 132).
C.

Statement Of Facts.

1.

Plaintiff presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency

department on April 23, 2009, complaining of headache. (R. p. 34). She was treated in the
emergency room by Defendant Jeff Johnson, P.A., who after evaluating the patient and
initially trying non-narcotic medications agreed to the Plaintiffs request that she be
provided with a limited amount of narcotic pain medication. Plaintiff was given the names
of local primary care physicians and told to set up care with a local provider.
2.

Plaintiff again presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency

department on April 27, 2009, complaining of headache. (R. p. 34). At that time, the
patient was seen by a different emergency room provider who documented that he was
concerned the patient had presented to the emergency room exhibiting drug seeking
behavior.
3.

Plaintiff again presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency

department on May 12, 2009, with another subjective pain complaint of suffering from a
headache. (R. p. 25-28). She was seen and treated in the emergency room by Jeff
Johnson, P.A. The patient again requested to be treated with narcotic pain medication. Id.
Plaintiff had failed to establish care with a primary care provider as previously instructed

1 This Court granted the defense/respondent motion to augment the record on appeal to
Include the District Court's February 27, 2012 decision denying Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment
under Rule 59(a). Counsel for Respondent is not clear how this document is being referred to on appeal as
an augmented portion of the record. As a result, this decision is simply attached as Exhibit A to this response
brief.
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and was asked again to do so. Id. The patient was provided with a limited amount of
narcotic pain medication and again instructed to establish care with a local provider rather
than simply coming into the emergency room for such care. Id. at 27.
4.

Dr. Randall Fowler was the supervising physician on duty in the

Portneuf emergency room during Plaintiff's May 12, 2009 visit. He did not examine or treat
Plaintiff at that time, but he agreed with Johnson's emergency medical treatment and
recommendations to the Plaintiff. See Aff. Randall Fowler, M.D. (R. p. 38).
5.

Plaintiff presented to the Portneuf Medical Center emergency

department on June 5,2009, with another subjective pain complaint that she was suffering
from a headache. (R. p. 29-33). At that time, she also reported radiating pain, nausea,
chills, night sweats, dizziness and light sensitivity. (R. p. 31). She was seen, evaluated and
treated in the emergency room by Defendant Jeff Johnson, P.A.ld. Because of the range
of symptoms described by the patient, P.A. Johnson performed the required ER physical
exam which included, among other things, auscultating the patient's heart and lungs. (R.
p. 30). The patient requested narcotic pain medication after alleging that the non-narcotic
pain medication administered by Johnson had not been effective at relieving her subjective
pain complaints. Id. Although inconsistent with a migraine headache, the patient reported
pain relief after receiving an intravenous injection of the narcotic drug morphine. Id. The
patient was again provided a limited prescription for narcotic pain medication and
instructed to establish a physician patient relationship with a local provider. rd.
6.

Dr. Kurtis Holt was the supervising physician on duty in the Portneuf

emergency room during Plaintiff's June 5,2009 visit. He did not examine or treat Plaintiff
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at that time, but he agreed with Johnson's emergency medical treatment and
recommendations to the Plaintiff. (R. p. 44).
7.

On each occasion that Plaintiff was treated by Defendant Johnson, the

patient made repeated requests for narcotic pain medication despite the fact that such
medication is not generally effective at relieving migraine headache pain. Following the
June 5, 2009 visit, the patient was refused a narcotic pain medication refill by the
Defendants. (R. p. 21, para. 9). This is because ER's do not provide prescription refills
which is one of the reasons why the patient was repeatedly told to establish care with a
local primary care physician.
8.

Plaintiff subsequently presented to the Portneuf Medical Center

emergency department on June 8,2009; July 6,2009; July 7,2009; July 21,2009; August
19,2009; and September 10,2009 all with continuing subjective complaints of a headache
and requesting further narcotic pain medication. (R. p. 34). It is unknown whether Plaintiff
ever sought treatment from any other medical providers during the above time period.

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in concluding that all of Plaintiff's claims arise out
of the provision of medical care and are therefore exclusively governed by
Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, specifically including the expert witness
requirements of Idaho Code §6-1 012?

2.

Did the District Court err in concluding that the affidavit of Dr. Bowman, in
which he fails to identify his medical specialty, fails to identify the physicians
with whom he claims to have consulted and fails to discuss the relevant time
period in describing his efforts to familiarize himself with the applicable
standard of health care practice, lacks foundation and is therefore
inadmissible?

3.

Does Idaho Code § 54-1814, which enumerates grounds for which a
licensed physician or physicians' assistant may be subject to discipline by the
Idaho State Board of Medicine, supercede Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act
by creating a statewide standard of health care practice for all medical
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providers, regardless oftime, location or medical specialty whenever a claim
for malpractice is alleged?

III.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 because of Appellant's
failure to identify any misapplication of the law and/or abuse of discretion by
the District Court?

IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the Appellate Court's
standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,871,136 P.3d 338, 342
(2006); see also U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 225, 999 P.2d 877,
880 (2000); see also First Sec. Bank v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787,790,964 P.2d 654, 657
(1998). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law summary
judgment is proper." Id.
Summary judgment is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is the
"principal tool ... by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] be isolated and
prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources." Paugh v. Ottman, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52281, *9-10 (D. Idaho 2008)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 377 (1986) (alterations in original)). In
evaluating the sufficiency of the materials submitted in opposition to summary judgment,
the Court must bear in mind the distinction between the requirements for admissibility of
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expert opinion testimony under Rule 56(e) and the test for sufficiency of such testimony
in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. The "admissibility of affidavits under
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is a threshold question to be analyzed before applying
the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules required when reviewing motions
for summary judgment." Edmunds at 871,136 P.3d 342. The Court must look at the
affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts, which taken as
true, would render the testimony admissible. Id. (citing Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l
Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160,163,45 P.3d 816,819 (2002)).
In order to determine whether the trial court erred in the granting of summary
judgment, it is first necessary to examine the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Edmunds,
142 Idaho at 872, 136 P.3d 343. Furthermore, "when reviewing the trial court's evidentiary
rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard." Id.

"A district court's

evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed by this Court, unless there has been a clear abuse
of discretion." McDaniel v.lnland Northwest Renal Care Group -Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho
219, 222, 159 P.3d 856, 861 (2007). ''To determine whether the trial court has abused its
discretion, we consider whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether
it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal
standards, and whether it reached its discretion by an exercise of reason." Shane v. Blair,
139 Idaho 126, 128-129, 75 P.3d 180, 182-183 (2003) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991)). See also Lamar
Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999)).
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V.
ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Properly Concluded That Plaintiff's Claims Are
Governed By Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act.
Although not clearly set forth in her opening brief, Plaintiff's repeated

defamatory representation of Respondent Johnson's efforts to auscultate her heart and
lungs during his examination appears aimed at pursuing both a battery claim and a
malpractice theory.2

Plaintiff cites to no authority to support a battery claim and

Respondents contend that under the facts of this case no such claim is recognized against
a health care provider under Idaho law. It is undisputed that the patient presented to the
emergency department at Portneuf Regional Medical Center complaining of a range of
symptoms, including headache, radiating pain, nausea, chills, night sweats, dizziness and
light sensitivity. (R. p. 31). As part of the reasonable and necessary evaluation for this
patient, Respondent Johnson conducted a physical examination which required him to
auscultate the patient's heart and lungs with his stethoscope. This act, performed in the
course and scope of providing medical care to evaluate the patient's condition, required
Respondent Johnson to partially remove the patient's bra and place the stethoscope on
the patient's chest in order to listen to her internal organs.
It is well settled thatthe requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013
apply to "any case, claim or action for damages due to injury ... brought against any
physician [,]. . physicians' assistant ... or any person vicariously liable for the negligence

2 It is worth noting that in the complaint Plaintiff describes the conduct at issue as follows
"Without consent Johnson then completely lifted Plaintiffs's bra up and over. exposing her left breast, looked
under her gown and brushed his hand over her left nipple, then continued with the stethoscope while resting
his hand on her left breast for approximately 15-20 seconds, while claiming to check her heartbeat." (R. p. 4).
Yet, hoping to invoke some passion, throughout her brief she falsely describes Respondent Johnson as
having "remov[ed] a patient's bra against her will, grabbing her breast, staring at it and hanging onto it for 1520 seconds .. " (See i.e. Plaintiffs opening brief dated May 22,2012 at p. 1,5,7,8,9, 12, 14).
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of them ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on account
of any matter incidental or related thereto. " See Idaho Code § 6-1012. Thus, any claim
brought against a health care providerfor claims involving the provision of health care must
be pled or will be deemed to have been pled as a claim for medical malpractice. See Litz
v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 284, 955 P.2d 113, 115 (Idaho App. 1997); Hough v. Fry,

131 Idaho 230,233,953 P.2d 980,983 (1998).
A plaintiff "cannot avoid the requirements of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 61013 by claiming his action is based on an intentional tort rather than negligence." Litz v.
Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 284, 955 P.2d 113, 115 (Ct. App. 1997). "The form of the

action is not the decisive test in actions against physicians, surgeons and dentists for
malpractice. The decisive test is the subject of the action." Id. at n.1. Accordingly, "to
determine if I.C. § 6-1012 applies, courts need only look to see if the injury occurred on
account of the provision of or failure to provide health care." Jones v. Crawforth, 147
Idaho 11,16,205 P.3d 660,665 (2009) (quoting Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230,233,953
P.2d 980, 983 (1998)) (emphasis in original).
The case of Litz v. Robinson is representative of the Idaho appellate courts'
response to a plaintiff's attempt at circumventing Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. In
Litz, the plaintiff argued Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 did not apply to his claims

because his cause of action was based on the intentional tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

The Court of Appeals rejected that reasoning, noting that the

"underlying nature of [the] claim . . . was inextricably intertwined with a claim of
negligence." 955 P.2d at 115 (citing to Trimming v. Howard, where this Court rejected a
plaintiff's argument that his cause of action against a surgeon was grounded in contract,
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reasoning that "the basic allegations of the complaint are directed solely to carelessness,
negligence and misconduct as the proximate cause of the injury claimed to have been
suffered." 52 Idaho 412, 415-16,16 P.2d 661,662 (1932)). Thus, the plaintiff was unable
to avoid the statutory requirements applicable to a claim for medical negligence by "artfully
labeling his cause of action as a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress."
Id.
Another decision addressing this issue can be found in the case of Hough

v. Fry. In Hough, the plaintiff argued her cause of action was not governed by I.C. §§ 61012 and 6-1013, arguing instead that it was a claim for injuries resulting from the "ordinary
negligence" of her therapist in failing to support her while she was on a balance board.
Hough, 131 Idaho at 233,953 P.2d at 983. This Court rejected that argument, stating:
"[t]here is nothing in the statute or its statement
of purpose to indicate that the type of
negligence, ordinary or professional, has
anything to do with the application of Section 61012. Rather, by its plain and unambiguous
language, the statute applies when the
damages complained of result from providing
or failing to provide health care." Id.
(emphasis added).
As the District Court in this case correctly pointed out, the Plaintiff alleges that
a battery "took place during and in connection with the provision of medical
treatment-listening to a heartbeat with a stethoscope. Surely these alleged acts fall under
the purview of 6-1012, especially in light of the language [in that statute] including 'any
matter incidental or related to the provision of medical care.'" (Ex. A, p.7]). The District
Court correctly noted that "the Idaho appellate courts disfavor allowing plaintiffs to escape
the requirements of 6-1012 and 6-1013 by 'artfully' labeling their causes of action as
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something other than medical malpractice when the alleged actions are connected to and
intertwined with the provision of medical care." (Ex. A, p. 8).

In the absence of any

authority to the contrary, the District Court properly treated all her claims, including claims
for intentional torts, as but one claim for medical malpractice.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Concluded Dr.
Bowman's Affidavit Failed To Comply With The Admissibility
Requirements Of Rule 56(e) And Idaho Code § 6-1013.

To be admissible, an affidavit opposing summary judgement must "set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." I.R.C.P. 56(e). The question of
admissibility of affidavits under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before
applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions
for summary judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P .2d 1224, 1227
(1994).
"Admissibility of expert testimony requires personal knowledge." Shane v.
Blair, 139 Idaho 126,129,75 P.3d 180,183 (2003). It is well settled that experts testifying

as to the standard of practice in medical malpractice actions must show that they have
familiarized themselves with the standard: 1) for the relevant community; 2) for the relevant
time; and, 3) for a particular profession. Arregui v. Gal/egos-Main, Docket 38496 (Idaho
May 4,2012); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533, 538 (2007); Perry v.
Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51,995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000); Kolin v. St.
Luke's Reg'l Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,331,940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997). Idaho Code

§ 6-1012 defines the relevant community and "is both site and time specific." 156 P.3d at
538 (quoting Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294, 296, 815 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1991 )). "[Idaho
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Code] Section 6-1013 requires actual knowledge of the standard of care in the community
where the alleged malpractice occurred." Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,146,937
P.2d 1212, 1220 (1997).

"They must also state how they became familiar with the

standard of care for the particular professional." Perry, 134 at 51, 995 P .2d at 821 (citing
Kolin v. Sf. Luke's Reg 'I Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,331,940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997»)
(emphasis added). As outlined herein and as properly concluded by the District Court, the
affidavit of Plaintiffs expert, Dr. Bowman, fails to comply with the foregoing requirements.
1.

As an of-of-area physician, Dr. Bowman has not set forth facts
showing he is familiar with the location and time specific
requirements regarding the standard of health care practice
applicable to each of the Defendant health care providers.

Dr. Bowman is not a Pocatello physician, nor is there any evidence in his
affidavit that he is an emergency room physiCian or an emergency room physicians'
assistant.

Thus, in order for Dr. Bowman's opinions against the Respondents to be

admissible for purposes of opposing the defense motion for summary judgment, he was
required to demonstrate-by setting forth "facts as would be admissible in evidence," that
he had taken affirmative steps in order to acquire actual knowledge of the Pocatello
standard of health care practice applicable to each of the Respondents. See Rule 56(e)
and Idaho Code § 6-1013(1 )(c).
In an attempt to comply with these requirements, Dr. Bowman states in his
affidavit that he spoke with two secret consultant physicians from Pocatello regarding the
allegations in the Complaint. (R p. 73). Of these secret consultants, one purportedly had
emergency room privileges in Pocatello in the past while the other purportedly had current
emergency room privileges in Pocatello. (R. p. 72-3 at para 6(a) and (c). There is no
reference to whether these unknown consultants ever had actual knowledge of the
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applicable standard of practice for 2009 for each of the Defendants in order to be able to
convey such information to Dr. Bowman. Throughout his affidavit, Dr. Bowman never
states that the secret consultant doctor(s) ever told him they were familiar with the standard
applicable to the Defendants for the 2009 time frame.
One of the anonymous doctors purportedly "had emergency room privileges
in Pocatello," but there is no indication of when he purportedly had such privileges
(perhaps many years before or since the relevant time period). (R. p. 72). Likewise, the
other anonymous physician purportedly "has privileges to practice emergency medicine in
Pocatello," but there is no indication of when he acquired such privileges (perhaps years

afterthe relevant time period). (R. p. 73). Again, these deficiencies render Dr. Bowman's
affidavit inadmissible due to a lack of foundation. Thus, Dr. Bowman's affidavit fails to
create an issue of fact because it does not set forth any "facts as would be admissible in
evidence."
This Court has previously ruled that no uniform standard of health care
practice can be assumed within the state of Idaho. Ramos, 144 Idaho at 38,156 P.3d at
539.

In fact, this Court has previously addressed the very question of whether the

applicable standard of health care practice is the same for Pocatello and Idaho Falls, and
found that it is not. See Gublerv. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,815 P.2d 1034, (1991) (upholding
the trial court's decision to exclude plaintiffs expert witness testimony where the expert had
not familiarized himself with the community standard of health care practice in Pocatello,
as he had spoken only with a doctor practicing in Idaho Falls). Accordingly, Dr. Bowman
was required to show how he became familiar with the relevant standard as it existed in
Pocatello in 2009.
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Plaintiff mis-states the relevant time period requirement of Idaho Code §61012 examined and explained by this Court in Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Reg 'I Med. Gtr.,
137 Idaho 160,45 P.3d 816 (2002). In Dulaney, the Court outlined remarkably similar
foundational deficiencies which it held rendered a plaintiff's expert affidavit inadmissible
for purposes of opposing a defense motion for summary judgment. There the Court noted:
Even assuming that the use of an anonymous
informant is an acceptable manner for
adequately familiarizing an out-of-area physician
of the local standard of care, Dr. Stump's
affidavit does not allege specific facts showing
that the anonymous professor was familiar with
the standard of care for orthopedic surgeons in
Boise in 1994. The professor stated that he had
trained orthopedic physicians "that presently
practice in Boise," but he did not state whether
they were practicing in Boise in 1994. He stated
that he has "maintained personal and
professional relationships with physicians in
Boise," but he did not state whether he did so
during 1994. He likewise did not state that he
had ever discussed with these orthopedic
physicians the standard of care for an orthopedic
physician practicing in Boise in 1994. He stated
that he had taught and lectured in Boise, but did
not state when he did so. Dr. Stump's affidavit
does not allege any specific facts showing that
the anonymous professor was familiar with the
standard of care for orthopedic surgeons in
Boise in August 1994. The professor's
conclusory statement that he was familiar with
the standard of care in Boise in 1994 is simply
not sufficient.
Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 169, 45 P.3d at 825.
Plaintiff reiterates that "Dr. Bowman repeats over and over, nine times, that
the specific timeframe of conduct he refers to is May and June of 2009." Appellant's Brief
p. 12.

That argument misses the point.
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The deficiency that the District Court held

rendered Dr. Bowman's affidavit inadmissible did not turn on whether he had properly
identified the time period of the alleged misconduct. The issue is whether his affidavit
demonstrates an adequate foundation for the conclusion that he has actual knowledge of
the applicable local standard of practice in 2009. The defense contends that Dr. Bowman's
affidavit fails to do so and was properly ruled inadmissible by the District Court. 3

2.

Dr. Bowman has not demonstrated that he is familiar with the
standard of health care practice applicable to each of the
Respondents' class of health care provider.

While it is clear from his affidavit that Dr. Bowman is an out-of-area physician,
it is equally unclear from his affidavit what sort of physician Dr. Bowman is. For example,
it is unknown from the face of his affidavit if he is a podiatrist, dermatologist, oncologist,
etc. 4 Presumably he is not an emergency room physician or else he would have simply
stated such in his affidavit.5 This creates additional foundational problems as it relates to
the court's ability to address the sufficiency of Dr. Bowman's affidavit. (R. p. 71-75).
Idaho Code § 6-1012 "makes clear that a health care provider must be
compared to a health care provider with similar training and in the same category or class,
'taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization.'"

3 As this Court pointed out in its recent medical malpractice decision in Arregui v. Gal/egosMain. although the affidavit in Dulaney "provided much more detail and facts regarding the anonymous
professor's knowledge and experience; nevertheless, the Court still found the affidavit lacked foundation
because it did not relate the professor's experience to the time period in question." Docket No. 38496. slip op.
at 27 (Idaho May 4,2012). Dr. Bowman's affidavit suffers from each and every deficiency the Dulaney Court
found in the Stump affidavit Accordingly. the Bowman affidavit is equally inadmissible
4 According to the Idaho State Board of Medicine. Dr. Bowman is a doctor of osteopathy with
a specialty in family medicine working at a skin clinic in Idaho Falls. There is no reference to him being in any
way affiliated with emergency medicine. See https/lisecure.bom.idaho.gov/BOMPublic/
LicensePublicRecord.aspx?Board=BOM&LicenseType=O&LicenseN0=175. Last accessed on July 11,2012.

51t arguably was the duty of Plaintiffs counsel to assist Dr. Bowman in avoiding these most
basic errors. As this Court has stated, a[t]he attorney must be involved in advising the expert as to how to
learn the applicable standard of care and determining whether the expert has done so." Ramos v. Dixon,
144 Idaho 32,37, 156 P3d 533,538 (2007).
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Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,905,935 P.2d 165,168 (1997) (quoting I.R.C.P. § 6-

1012). This Court has clearly stated that it cannot be assumed that the standard of health
care practice is the same for physicians of different specialties, even where the procedure
at issue is relatively simple. See Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110,121,254 P.3d
11, 22 (2011) (rejecting the plaintiff's argument that there is a "statewide mandate in every
profession requiring an adequate patient history");6 see also Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163,45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002) (finding that an expert

neurologist's testimony was properly excluded where there were no facts in the record
showing the standards for a neurologist was the same as for the defendant emergency
room physician or orthopedic surgeon).
Consistent with the requirements of Idaho Code §6-1 012 and 6-1013 as set
forth in Dulaney, a[t]he witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience
or study of the standards of the specialty of the defendant physician sufficient to enable
him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to those
particular standards ... " Id. at 824. Accordingly, Dr. Bowman was required to show how
he became familiar with the standard of health care practice applicable to the
Respondents' particular professions. As an out-of-town physician of an unknown specialty,
Plaintiff was required to have Dr. Bowman explain in his affidavit how he is qualified to
render opinions against each of the Defendants.
Turning to his affidavit, Dr. Bowman again relies totally on having: 1)
"previously hired a doctor from Pocatello to work for me, and he had emergency room

6 Appellant misreads the facts of the Suhadolnik case which is one of defense counsel's
cases It did not concern the requirements for an expert to testify concerning the details of a cataract surgery;
rather. it concerned. in part. the taking of an "adequate patient history." Suhadolnik v. Pressman. 151 Idaho
110.121.254 P3d 11.22 (2011).
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privileges in Pocatello" (R. p. 72); 2) "evaluated the emergency room at Portneuf Medical
Center" (R. p. 73); and, 3) "personally spoke with another medical doctor in Pocatello who
also has privileges to practice emergency medicine in Pocatello." (R. p. 73). The District
Court properly concluded this showing was inadequate as nothing in the record
demonstrates that Dr. Bowman would have "knowledge acquired from experience or study
of the standards" applicable to a physicians' assistant or to a physician specializing in
emergency medicine.
Dr. Bowman's affidavit does not identify the doctor whom he claims to have
hired to work for him, nor does he identify that doctor's medical specialty. Similarly, Dr.
Bowman fails to identify the other medical doctor in Pocatello with whom he spoke or how
and when it is was that this secret consultant "has privileges to practice emergency
medicine in Pocatello." (R. p. 73). As a result, the Court cannot glean from Dr. Bowman's
vague references to anonymous physicians whether they have actual knowledge of the
standard of health care practice applicable to the Respondents for the pertinent time period
of May and June. 2009. As phrased by the Dulaney Court, "[t]here are no facts showing"
the anonymous familiarizing physicians "had actual knowledge of the standard of care for
those medical specialties."Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 168, 45 P.3d at 824. There is nothing in
Dr. Bowman's affidavit that demonstrates he has any familiarity with the Respondents'
particular professions, which again renders his affidavit lacking in foundation and therefore
inadmissible.

3.

Respondent Johnson can only be judged in comparison with the
standard of health care practice applicable to a physician
assistant.

Dr. Bowman's affidavit demonstrates that he does not recognize there is a
distinction between the standards applicable to a physician versus those applicable to a
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physicians' assistant.

Dr. Bowman consistently lumps together the standards for

physicians and physicians' assistants by stating: "I am familiar with the standard of care
of physicians practicing in Pocatello, Idaho, and know first-hand the applicable standard
of care for physicians and physicians' assistants . .. " (R. p. 72) (emphasis added); " .
. . as such standard then and there existed with respect to physicians and physicians'

assistants operating or functioning in Jeff Johnson's capacity" (R. p. 72) (emphasis
added); ".

. it is my opinion that the treatment given by Jeff Johnson to Heather Hall, as

described in paragraph 15 of her complaint, on June 5, 2009, failed to meet the standard
of care of physicians and physicians' assistants . ... " (R. p. 74) (emphasis added). As
a physician and not a physicians' assistant, Dr. Bowman was required (even with the
assistance of Plaintiff's counsel) to take affirmative steps to educate himself about the
standards applicable to physicians' assistants working in the emergency room in Pocatello
in 2009. There is nothing in Dr. Bowman's affidavit that demonstrates he has made any
attempt to do so, which again renders his affidavit lacking in foundation and therefore
inadmissible.
Plaintiff cannot overlook the fact there is a difference between a physician,
i.e. Dr. Bowman, and a physicians' assistant, i.e. Respondent Johnson, which is expressly
recognized by statute. For purposes of establishing a cause of action for malpractice in
Idaho, the focus is not the type of medical procedure performed, but rather the type of
health care provider performing it. Idaho Code §6-1 012. The Plaintiff therefore cannot get
around the foundational deficiencies in Dr. Bowman's affidavit by artfully arguing that "[t]he
medical procedure in this case is so basic it is universally delegated to assistants."
Appellant's Brief p. 12.
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In Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,935 P.2d 165 (1997), a plaintiff in a
medical malpractice case argued that in the context of prescribing medication that an
optometrist should be held to the same standard as an ophthalmologist since both are
licensed to prescribe medication. Griswold, 129 Idaho at 905,935 P.2d at 168. This Court
disagreed, noting that such an argument "ignores the requirements of I.C. Sections 6-1 012
and 6-1013." Id. The Court went on to explain that "an ophthalmologist is a medical
practitioner of a different class than an optometrist," meaning they cannot be held to the
same standard. Id. As a result, summary judgment for the defendant health care provider
was affirmed
Similarly, in Dulaney, this Court determined a plaintiff's neurology expert was
not competent to testify, because he had not familiarized himself with the standard of
practice applicable to the defendants' medical specialties of emergency care and
orthopedic surgery. The Court commented that "with respect to the care at issue, the local
standard for a neurologist [might be] the same as that for an emergency room physician
or orthopedic surgeon." Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 168, 45 P.3d at 824. However, the Court
found the expert failed to demonstrate such by showing he had "actual knowledge of the
applicable standard of care for emergency room physicians or orthopedic surgeons." Id.
Thus, the expert was not qualified to testify.?
As demonstrated by the optometrist and ophthalmologist at issue in
Griswold, it may be common for physicians of a different class, with different "training,

experience, and fields of medical specialization," to perform the same procedure. Idaho
Code § 6-1012. This does not mean, however, that they are to be held to the same

The expert in Dulaney was not disqualified simply because his was of a different
medical specialty from the defendant health care provider, but rather because he had not familiarized
himself with the standard applicable to the defendant's medical specialty.
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standard of health care practice-in fact, doing so is forbidden by statute in Idaho. Plaintiff
contends that because the malpractice at issue did not involve a "technical medical
procedure requiring board certification," that "any licensed physician in Idaho" should be
deemed qualified to testify against Respondent Johnson and his treatment of the patient.
Appellant's Brief p. 11. Plaintiff cites to no case authority to support such a proposition,
which is squarely in conflict with the express language of Idaho Code §6-1012. The
Griswold and Dulaney cases outlined above solidify the conclusion that it is the defendant
health care provider's medical specialty that determines the applicable standard, not the
procedure in question. While it is true that physicians, physicians' assistants, registered
nurses, and nurse practitioners are all capable of auscultating a patient's heart and lungs,
they all, however, have different "training, experience, and fields of medical specialty" and
therefore, under Idaho Code § 6-1012, are held to different standards.
Indeed, a simple example would be that of a cardiologist who specializes in
heart medicine who would have vastly different training and experience in auscultation of
a patient's heart and lungs than would a family physician or a dermatologist.

It was

precisely because of these differences that the statutory language was employed to
insulate health care providers from being held to an unfair standard of practice. Without
such statutory language, one could easily see scenarios wherein patients would seek to
use health care providers with more specialized training to testify against lesser qualified
or experienced providers.
Idaho Code § 6-1012 specifically lists "physicians' assistant" among the
classes of health care providers to which the Act applies. As such, Respondent Johnson
must be judged "in comparison with similarly trained and qualified providers of the same
class in the same community." Idaho Code § 6-1012 (emphasis added). To comply with
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this requirement and to establish an issue of fact, Plaintiff's affidavit from Dr. Bowmen was
required to set forth how he acquired personal knowledge of the standard of practice
applicable to a physicians' assistant like Respondent Johnson.

Without such an

explanation, his affidavit was properly excluded by the District Court based on a lack of
foundation.s
In addition, the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment to all the
Defendants, on

.ill!

of the claims, was proper since "[t]he other claims in the complaint

against Johnson's supervising physicians and Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians,

L. L.C are derived from the claims against Johnson." (R. p. 107). Therefore, because
Plaintiff provided no admissible expert opinion that Respondent Johnson had committed
any malpractice, the derivative malpractice claims against the other Respondents (who had
no direct contact with the patient) also fail.

C.

The District Court Properly Concluded That Idaho Code § 54-1814 Does
Not Establish A Statewide Standard of Practice Applicable To The
Health Care At Issue In This Case.
Plaintiff argues that her allegations of "groping" required the Defendants to

address in their affidavits this specific conduct and to address the alleged statewide
standard established per Idaho Code § 54-1814. Appellant's Brief p. 12. This argument
is without merit as it confuses the respective burdens placed on the moving and nonmoving parties. It is well settled that at the summary judgment phase, the moving party is
required only to point out the "absence of evidence" to support the non-moving party's
case. Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120 P.3d 278, 281 (2005). At that point it is

8 The District Court found that "all these deficiencies, collectively and individually, render Dr.
Bowman's affidavit inadmissible under I.RCP. 56(e) and IC. §§ 6-1012 and 1013" (R P 107) (emphasis
added)
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the non-moving party's burden to "come forward with evidence, and to 'set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" [d. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e) (internal
cites omitted). The non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of that party's pleadings." I.R.C.P. 56(e).
The Defendant health care providers did, to the extent required of them,
address the specific conduct at issue, because that "conduct" was the provision of medical
care. Jeff Johnson, P.A., Dr. Holt and Dr. Fowler each filed Affidavits which set forth their
actual knowledge of the local standard of health care practice applicable to emergency
medical providers in Pocatello, Idaho in 2009. (R. p. 19-47). Those affidavits further stated
that the care and treatment they provided complied in all respects with the applicable local
community standard of health care practice for Pocatello, Idaho, in 2009. Id. Accordingly,
said Affidavits established the elements required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 1013, as
well as Rule 56(e) and were sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the Plaintiff to respond.
Thus, the burden was shifted "to the non-moving party to produce evidence
sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor." Foster, 120 P.3d at 281. The Plaintiff "may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleadings." I.R.C.P. 56(e). If the
evidence put forth by the non-moving party is in the form of an affidavit, the affidavit "must
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein" and
"shall be made on personal knowledge." Id. The question of admissibility of affidavits
under Rule 56(e) is a "threshold question to be analyzed before applying the liberal
construction and reasonable inferences rules when reviewing motions for summary
judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994).
With the above principles in mind, it is clear that Dr. Bowman's affidavit does
not rise to the task of creating a genuine issue of material fact, because his "opinions" are
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nothing more than a restatement of the allegations in the pleadings, and are not based on
the affiant's personal knowledge. Dr. Bowman's affidavit states that his opinions are based
on the medical records and the Complaint filed in this case. (R. p. 74). With respect to the
allegations in the Complaint, Dr. Bowman states that "the treatment given by Jeff Johnson
to Heather Hall, as described in paragraph 15 of her complaint" violated "the standard of
care expected of any health care provider in Pocatello, whether in an emergency room or
otherwise." Id. (emphasis added). Such a statement fails to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 56(e).
To the extent Dr. Bowman wants to base his opinions on the allegations in
the Complaint, the allegations are simply that, allegations; they are not facts in evidence.
It is well settled in the summary judgment setting that a Plaintiff may not rely merely upon
the allegations in her complaint, but rather she must set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence in order to create an issue of fact. Rule 56(e): Suhadolnik v.
Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P.3d 11 (2011). That requirement is not satisfied when

the Plaintiff simply re-states her allegations by proxy, as she has done here through Dr.
Bowman's affidavit. Dr. Bowman has done nothing to affirmatively show he has personal
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint, such that he would be competent to testify
with regard to those allegations.
For example, there is no evidence that Dr. Bowman ever read the Affidavit
of Heather Hall, that he ever spoke to Heather Hall or that he ever even read the defense
affidavits. Rather, his opinions are consistently qualified by phrases such as "as described
in paragraph 15 of her complaint" and "if Heather Hall's report of what occurred on June
5,2009, is accurate." (R. pp. 74, 75). Such phrases demonstrate that Dr. Bowman has no
personal knowledge regarding whether the allegations are true, or not Therefore, his
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opinions necessarily are conclusory, speculative and not based on personal knowledge of
the affiant As such, they are inadmissible under I.R.C.P. 56(e).
Likewise, Dr. Bowman's statement that his opinions are based in any way on
his review of the medical records is of no support. The medical records of Heather Hall do
not address, nor do they in any way support the allegations set forth in her Complaint (see
R. pp. 25-35). The medical records describe the encounters Respondent Johnson had
with the patient on the dates in question. Id. In his affidavit, Dr. Bowman does not point
to anything in the medical records that supports his opinions or his conclusions that there
were any failures or violations of the standards of practice by any of the Respondents. Dr.
Bowman was required to state with particularity what each Respondent did that amounted
to a violation of the applicable standard of practice. His failure to do so renders his affidavit
insufficient to establish an issue of fact.
Furthermore, the legislative intent, language and requirements of Idaho Code

§ 54-1801 et seq. are not compatible with the requirements for maintaining a medical
malpractice action as set forth in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. "It is well established
that statutes should be interpreted to mean what the legislature intended them to mean."

Walker v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 268, 629 P.2d 662, 664
(1981). The stated purpose of Idaho's "Medical Practice Act" (I.C. § 54-1801 et seq) is "to
assure the public health, safety and welfare in the state by the licensure and regulation of
physicians, and the exclusion of unlicensed persons from the practice of medicine." Idaho
Code § 54-1801 (emphasis added). To further the purpose of that Act, § 54-1814 provides
"Grounds for Medical Discipline," whereby those licensed to practice medicine in Idaho
may be "subject to discipline by the board pursuant to the procedures set forth in [Chapter
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18] and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto."

Idaho Code § 54-1814 (emphasis

added).
Plaintiff provides no authority to support the proposition that the provisions
of Idaho's Medical Practice Act have any application in the context of a civil action seeking
damages based on allegations of medical malpractice.

Defendants contend this is

because no such authority exists as the Idaho legislature never intended the Medical
Practice Act to apply in civil actions like the case at bar. Rather, the legislature enacted
Idaho Code § 6-1001 et seq, Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, to apply in "any case, claim
or action for damages" brought against a health care provider in Idaho. Idaho Code § 61012.
Unlike the requirements set forth under Idaho Code § 54-1814, Idaho Code

§ 6-1012 requires "direct expert testimony" that the defendant physician failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the local community. Strode v. Lenzi, 116
Idaho 214,775 P.2d 106 (1989); Dekkerv. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115
Idaho 332,766 P.2d 1213 (1988); Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130, 795 P.2d 24 (Ct. App.
1990); Dulaneyv. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164,45 P.3d
816 (2002); Fosterv. Traul, 141 Idaho 890,120 P.3d 278 (2005); Ramos v. Dixon, 144
Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533 (2007) see also McDaniel v.lnland Northwest Renal Care, 144
Idaho 219, 159 P.3d 856 (2007)

"[T]o allow plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits to

establish that a provider has breached the standard of care indirectly by showing that he
or she breached a statute or rule flies in the face of the legislature's intent that plaintiffs
prove that the provider breached the standard of care through direct testimony."
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176,183,219 P.3d 1192, 1199 (2009).
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As discussed in Section A, above, Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, by its
very terms, applies to "any case, claim or action for damages" brought against a health
care provider in Idaho. Idaho Code § 6-1012. Whereas, Idaho Code § 54-1814, by its
very terms, applies to "discipline by the board."

It is worth noting that Idaho Code § 54-

1814(7) contains language "similar to the well-accepted definition of medical malpractice,"
yet, one statute provides a rubric under which medical malpractice claims for damages are
considered, and the other provides that the Idaho State Board of Medicine may initiate
disciplinary procedures when it determines that malpractice has occurred. Haw v. Idaho

st.

Bd. Of Med., 140 Idaho 152, 158, 90 P.3d 902, 908 (2004). The two statutes do not

overlap in their application, because the statutes have different purposes and different
requirements.
Some of the problems associated with plaintiffs' intermingling of rules and
statutes were highlighted in the case of Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 183,219 P.3d
1192, 1199 (2009).

There, the appellants argued that the District Court abused its

discretion in not permitting their undisclosed expert witness to testify that the defendants'
failure to abide by the terms of a Delegation of Services (DOS) Agreement (as required by
IDAPA § 22.01.03.030.04) constituted a breach of the standard of care in their medical
malpractice claim.

In upholding the District Court's decision to exclude the expert

testimony, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the testimony would not have saved the
appellants' case even if it had been allowed. The Court pointed out that the specificity
required by Idaho Code § 6-1012 regarding the applicable local standard of health care
practice was in contrast to the generality of DOS agreements. The Court also noted that
Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires a plaintiff's expert to testify to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that a breach of the standard of practice occurred, not that a breach of
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a DOS agreement occurred. As such, to permit a plaintiff to establish a breach of the
standard of practice via testimony regarding breach of a DOS agreement would "fl[y] in the
face of the legislature's intent." Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 183, 219 P.3d at 1199.
Appellant has not produced any medical evidence suggesting that
Respondent Johnson had no medical purpose associated with his actions in touching the
patient or being in proximity to her breast.

The fact the patient contends after her

examination that subjectively she felt the touching was offensive or unnecessary is
irrelevant Indeed, many medical examinations and procedures can be extremely offensive
or even demeaning to the average lay person, alia mammograms, prostate exams or
colonoscopyexams. This does not mean the subjective beliefs of the patient rule the day
in a malpractice case.
Rather, the issue is whether the procedure was medically necessary and
whether the manner in which it was performed was consistent with the applicable
standards of practice for the health care provider at issue. 9 Touching one's "private parts"
as part of rendering required emergency medical care in an emergency room in Idaho does
not equate to "conduct which constitutes an abuse or exploitation of a patient" under Idaho
Code § 54-1814(22). To even establish such a ground in disciplinary proceeding, the
Idaho Board of Medicine would still be required to present qualified expert testimony that
such conduct did, if fact, meet the elements of the statute.
Simply stating a patient's subjective belief that she was improperly touched
and then referring to a statute that provides for discipline for health care providers who

9 It should be noted that Plaintiff has not pled a claim based on lack of informed consent for
any of the care at issue. Lack of informed consent is an entirely separate and distinct claim from a medical
malpractice claim. See Idaho Code § 39-4506, et seq.
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engage in abuse or exploitation of a patient does not create a statewide minimum standard
of practice for auscultating one's heart and lungs. In order to overcome a defense motion
for summary judgment a patient is still required per Idaho Code § 6-1012 to present expert
testimony demonstrating that the conduct in question violated the local standard of health
care practice in the absence of an unequivocal minimum statewide standard which has not
been demonstrated in this case. Since no such minimum standard exists in this case, nor
was one ever advocated by Plaintiff's expert Dr. Bowman, it does not serve to create an
issue of fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment.

This was part and parcel of the

District Court's decision which should be affirmed in all respects.
Plaintiff's argument that § 54-1814(22) creates a statewide standard for
performing a medical examination is analogous to the argument rejected by this Court in
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho. 144 Idaho 219, 159 P.3d 856

(2007). There, the appellant argued that 42 C.F.R. § 405 Subpart U (which "prescribe[s]
the role which End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) networks have in the ESRD program .
. . and describe the health and safety requirements that facilities furnishing ESRD care to
beneficiaries must meet") created a "minimum national standard of care with respect to
services provided by ESRD dialysis facilities." Id. 144 Idaho 222-23, 159 P.3d at 859-60.

10 Respondents agree with Plaintiff that Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. etr., 134 Idaho
46. 51. 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000), "stands for the rule that if the expert testifies a national standard applies.
and can demonstrate that, it is not even necessary to consult a local physician." Appellant's Brief p. 10
(emphasis added). However, Perry concerned only the narrow question of whether it is possible to
demonstrate that a national standard applies by reviewing the deposition of a local practitioner, rather than
consulting with a local practitioner. This Court found that it is possible to make such a demonstration where
the expert is familiar with the national standard and reviews the deposition of one familiar with both the
national and local standard. whose deposition testimony also states that the two are not different The
reasoning In Perry has no bearing here. however, where Dr Bowman did not review any deposition testimony.
In fact there is no deposition testimony to review. as no party has taken any depositions
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In rejecting that argument, this Court noted "a marked difference between
regulations that govern the physical administration of health care services and those that
govern other aspects of a health care provider's practice." Id. 144 Idaho at 223, 159 P.3d
at 860. This Court went on to state that "[w]here the promulgated regulations do not
concern the administration of health care services ... Idaho Code § 6-1012 dictates that
the applicable standard of health care is that practiced in 'the community in which such
care allegedly was or should have been provided.'" Id. Thus, the local community standard
applied."
D.

Respondents Are Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant
To Idaho Code § 12-121 And I.A.R. 41(a).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) governs the award of attorney fees.
It states:
In any civil action the court may award
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion
of the court may include paralegal fees, to the
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule
54(d)(1 )(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract Provided, attorney fees under section
12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the
court only when it finds, from the facts presented
to it, that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be
awarded pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho
Code, on a default judgment.
"Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) 'creates no substantive right to attorney fees, but
merely establishes a framework for applying I.C. § 12-121.'" Newberry v. Martens, 142

11 Plaintiff would do just as well to cite the Idaho Criminal Code, which provides a "statewide
standard" prohibiting battery. Neither "standard" supercedes the local community standard of proof required
in Idaho Code § 6-1012 in a malpractice claim seeking money damages.
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Idaho 284,292, 127 P.2d 187,195 (2005) (citing Huffv. Uhl, 103 Idaho 274,277 n.1, 647
P.2d 730, 733 n.1 (1982)).
According to the Idaho Supreme Court:
Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under
that statute [Idaho Code § 12-121] only if this
Court is left with the abiding belief that the
appeal was brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, and without foundation. Where
an appeal turns on the question of law, an
award of attorney fees under this section is
proper if the law is well settled and the
appellant has made no substantial showing
that the district court misapplied the law.
Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001). (emphasis

added) (citation omitted).
Respondents contend that the case authority interpreting Rule 56(e) and
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 specifically discuss the steps an out-of-area expert
must take in order to sufficiently familiarize himself or herself with the local standard of
practice. The actions of Dr. Bowman, relying solely on anonymous physicians in order to
familiarize himself without reference to medical specialty or time frame, resulted in a
foundationally defective affidavit despite the presence of well-established Idaho case
authorities regarding summary judgment in medical malpractice cases.

Respondents

further contend that Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and interpreting case authority
firmly establish that Plaintiff's claims, and the applicable standard of health care practice,
are governed exclusively by Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act.
Based on the record before the Court, Respondents contend Appellant has
unreasonably pursued this appeal and has failed to establish a credible misapplication of
the law by the District Court. In light of the substantial expenses incurred as a result of this
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undertaking, Respondents respectfully request that they be awarded attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a).
VI.
CONCLUSION

The District Court properly concluded that Dr. Bowman's affidavit failed to
comply with the threshold foundational requirements set forth under Rule 56(e).
Bowman is an out-of-area physician

Dr.

His affidavit states he relied upon anonymous

physicians to learn about the local standard of practice.

There is no evidence the

anonymous physicians were familiar with the standard of health care practice for the
relevant time period, which the District Court properly concluded prevented Dr. Bowman's
affidavit from being admissible. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion
and properly granted the Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The Respondents
therefore respectfully request this Court affirm the District Court's decision in all respects
and that the Respondents be awarded costs and attorney fees for defending against this
appeal.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2012.
CAREY PERKINS

LLP

Terrence S. Jones, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

Tracy L. Wright, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of July, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by delivering the same to each of
the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows:
Allen Browning
BROWNING LAw

482 Constitution Way, Suite 111
idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
Telephone (208) 542-2700
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appel/ant

[Xl

u.s.

Mail, postage prepaid
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ J Facsimile (208) 542-2711

Tracy L. Wright
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

ST ATE OF IDAHO, BANNOCK COUNTY

BEA TUER HALL,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: CV-2011-1740-PI

v.
ROCKY MOUNTAIN EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, L.L.C., and KlJRTIS
HOLT, M.D., and RANDALL FOWLER,
M.D., and JEFF .JOHNSON,

DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEl\D JUDGMENT
UNDER RULE 59(a)
(MOTION TO RECONSIDER)

Defendants.
Hon. David C. Nye

This matter came before the COUJi for a hearing on Plaintiff Heather Hall's Motion on
January 23, 2012. Allen Browning appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Heather Hall, and Tracy
Wright appeared in behalf of all Defendants. At the hearing, the Court took Hall's motion under
advisement, and now issues its decision, denying the motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Hall's visits to the Portncuf Medical Center ("PMC") emerg":I1ey
room in Pocatello to receive treatment for headaches. She alleges that on one occasion, a
physician's assistant, .lefT Johnson, in the course of a medical examination, touched her breast
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Exhibit A

inappropriately while listening to her heartbeat with a stethoscope. She brought claims against
Johnson for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. She also
asserted claims against Drs. Kurtis Holt and Randall Fowler for negligent supervision of
Johnson. Additionally, Hall asserted a claim against Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians,

L.L.c., under the theory of respondeat superior. Defendants did not submit an answer to Hall's
complaint, but moved for summary judgment in August 2011. On October 25,2011, the Court
granted summary judgment to Defendants on all of Hall's claims against them, and entered
judgment on November 1,2011.
On November 10, 2011, Hall filed a document entitled "Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rule 59(a)." Hall's Memorandum in Support was
filed alone-unaccompanied by a separate document containing an actuaJ motion. At the January
bearing. Hall requested that the Court consider her Memorandum as a motion as well. The basic
substance of Hall's Memorandum is a request that the Court reconsider its summary judgment
decision. However, the Court noted at the January hearing that Rule 59(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure pertains only to a motion for a new trial, so Hall also requested at the hearing
that the Court consider her Memorandum a motion to reconsider brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(B).
Defendants object to the substance of Hall's Memorandum, as well as both requests Hall made at
the hearing.
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II. ANAL YSIS
The Court denies Hall's "motion" on three alternative grounds: no motion was filed with
the Memorandum, Rule 59(a) is not the proper rule for a motion to reconsider, and summary
judgment to Defendants was proper.
A. No motion filed with Memorandum
Lnder IRCP 7(b)(1), "[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which,
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing . . . . "1 Additionally, Rule
7(b)(3)(C) provides:

It shall not be necessary to file a brief or memorandum of law in suppon of a
motion, but the moving party must indicate upon the face of the motion whether
the party desires to present oral argument or file a brief within fourteen (14) days
with the court in support of the motion.
Nothing in Rule 7 provides that a brief or memorandum in support of a motion may be
considered the actual motion itself. The beginning portion of Rule 7(b)(3) does contain the
phrase "(u]nless otherwise ordered by the court," suggesting that the trial court has the discretion
whether to allow a memorandum in support to be considered as a motion also.
The Court hereby exercises its discretion by denying Hall's request to treat her
Memorandum as a motion also. Rule 7(b)(l) plainly indicates that when a party makes an
application to the court for an order, it shall be by motion. The Rule does not provide that sLlch
an application can be made by simply a memorandum in support. The Court therelore finds
Hall's Memorandum in Support procedurally improper because no motion was properly filed in
accordance \\lith IRCP 7(b)(1).
1

(emphasis added).
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Any oral motion made at the hearing on January 23, 2012, was untimely and cannot be
considered a proper motion under Rule 7.

B. Rule 59(a) not proper for a motion to reconsider
The Court also finds, alternatively, that Hall's Memorandum was not brought under the
correct rule. IRCP 7(b)(1) provides that a motion to the court "shall state with particularity the
grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under which it is filed,
and shall sct forth the relief or order sought." In this case, Hall's Memorandum cites {RCP 59(a),
which provides that "[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues in an action for any of the following reasons .... " Nothing in Rule 59(a) provides for
a motion to reconsider when, as in this case, there has been no lrial.
The Court denies Hall's request to treat her Memorandmll as a motion for reconsideration
brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(B). The Court finds that Hall's Memorandum, even if the C01.111
considered it an actual motion under Rule 7(b)(1), was not procedurally proper because it failed
to cite the appropriate Rule, thereby failing to give Defendants notice of the precise grounds for
her request.

c.

Summary judgment to Defendants was proper
Alternatively, even if the Court agreed to treat Hall's Memorandum as a motion for

reconsideration properly brought under Rule 11(a)(2)(13), the Court would still deny Hall's
motion on its merits because summary judgment to Defendants was proper in the first place"
--------~----

2 The well-known standard of review on summary judgment was set forth in the Court's prior decision. It is hereby
incorporated by reference.
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When Defendants moved for summary judgment, they produced several affidavits. In the
affidavit of Johnson, he described how he has actual, personal knowledge of the applicable
standard of can: for Pocatello and PMC, and he stated that he did not violate the standard of care

in his treatment of Hall. The atIidavits of Drs. Kurtis Holt and Randall Fowler also described
how they have actual, personal knowledge of the standard of care for physicians supervising
physician's assistants in Pocatello and PMC, and they stated that they did not violate that
standard of care in their supervision ofJohnson. lIall did not challenge the admissibility of those
affidavit opinions. Hall's response in opposition was based solely on the affidavit of Dr. David
Howman.
Assuming that Hall's claims are properly treated as medical malpractice claims-vl/hich
IS

addressed below-the Defendants' affidavits successfully shifted the burden in summary

judgment to Hall to produce a qualified expert opinion in accordance with Idaho Code § 6-1012,
Hall had to provide at least some evidence that Defendants violated the applicable standard of
care in her case in order to survive summary judgment. Hall responded by submiUing the
affidavit of Dr. Bowman, but the Court found it inadmissible in its entirety for lack of
foundation. As a consequence, Hall had no other admissihle evidence that Defendants violated
the standard of care. Therefore, Hall failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of
material fact necessitating a trial on the medical malpractice claims. Accordingly, the Court held
that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment,
In her current motion, Hall does not challenge the Court's ruling that Dr. Bow1nan's
affidavit was inadmissible. She argues that the Court should have denied summary judgment
Case No.: CV-201 1-1740-(>1
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because Defendants did not acknowledge or admit Hall's allegations that Johnson
inappropriately groped her. She also argues that Defendants never claimed that the alleged
groping would not violate the standard of care. Hall also argues that Defendants never
contradicted Dr. Bowman's statement that the alleged groping violated the state\X;ide ethical
standards for physician'S assistants.
Hall's argument concerning Dr. Bowman's statement fails because the Court previously
found Dr. Bowman's affidavit inadmissible, and Hall has not challenged that ruling. Hall's other
arguments primarily depend on whether her intentional tort claims were properly treated as
medical malpractice claims.
In its summary judgment decision, the Court noted that although Hall brought intentional
tort claims, her entire case would be treated as a standard medical malpractice case rather than an
ordinary tort case. The Court acknowledges that some additional explanation is necessary to
clarify that particular ruling, but the overall outcome remains the same.
Idaho Code § 6-1012, which governs medical malpractice cases, contains the following
provision concerning cases which fall under its purview:

lA ]ny case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any person,
brought against any [health care provider] ... on account of the provision of or
failure to provide health care or on account of any matter incidental or reluted
thereto ....
Such cases falling under this definition must comply with the other provisions of 6-1012, which
requires the opinion of an expert witness to prove a violation of the applicable standard of
healthcare.
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Obviously, not every conceivable lawsuit against a health eare provider would require
compliance with 6-1012. In Hough v, Fry, the plaintiff fell and was injured while using a balance
board as part of her supervised physical therapy treatment. 3 The plaintiff attempted to sue her
physical therapist under a theory of ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice, but the
Idaho Supreme COUti stated:
Hough argues that § 6-1012 should not be read to require expert testimony every
time a provider of medical care is sued for negligence, We agree, \Ve can
conceive of circumstances where the alleged act of negligence is so far removed
or unrelated to the provision of medical care that § 6-1012 would not apply. This,
however, is not one of those cases. The act complained of was so directly related
to providing Hough with physical therapy that it cannot be reasonably argued that
§ 6-1012 does not apply.4
Thus, the plaintiff in Hough still had to comply with the requirements of 6-1012 in order to

survive summary judgment.
Similarly, this Court recogmzes that there are conceivable circumstances where the
healthcare provider's alleged act of intentional tort is so far removed from or unrelated to the
provision ofmcdieal care that 6-1012 should not apply. However, Hall's case is not one of those
circumstances. The intentional torts a1legedly took place during and in connection with the
provision of medical treatment-listening to a heartbeat with a stethoscope. Surely these alleged
aCls

fal! under the purview of 6-1012, especially in light of the language including "any mattcr

incidental or related" to the provision of medical care. Other than thc Idaho Suprcme Court's
statement in Hough, no Idaho case has addressed precisely how a court should determine if a

3

4

131 Idaho 230, 231·32, 953 P.2d 980, 981·82 (1998).
fd. at 233,953 P.2d at 983.
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claim against a healthcare provider is related enough to the provision of healtheare such that the
claims should be required to comply with the expert witness provisions of 6-1 012. However, this
Court finds that due to the proximity and connection betv,reen the alleged acts of intentional tort
and the provision of medical care, Hall's claims should be required 10 comply with 6-1012. This
Court's holding is bolstered by the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in Litz v. Robinson, where
the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that Litz was required to comply with I.e. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
Litz's later attempt to escape the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 by
artfully labeling his cause of action as a claim for the intentional inDiction of
emotional distress is not persuasive in consideration that the underlying nature of
Litz's claim, as pled in his complaint and in further documentation suhmitted to
the district court, was inextricably intertwined with a claim of negligence. s
Thus, it is apparent that the Idaho appellate courts disfavor allowing plaintiffs to escape the
requirements of 6-1012 and 6-1013 by "artfully" labeling their causes of action as something
other than medical malpractice when the alleged actions are connected to and intertwined with
the provision of medical care.
Obviously, in an ordinary intentional tort claim, a defendant could not be granted
summary judgment without submitting at least some evidence refuting the plaintiff"s allegations
of what events took place. In this case, if Hall's intentional tort claims were treated as such
instead of medical malpractice claims, Defendants could not be granted summary judgment
\vithout at least first denying that inappropriate touching took place. However, when the case is
tn:alcd as a medical malpractice case, lIall's own spccific allegations of what took place are not

5

]31 Idaho 282,284,955 P.2d J 13, J]5 (Cl. App. 1997).

Case No.: CV-201l-1740-PI
DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(a)
(MOTION TO RECONSIDER)
Page 8 of to

as important as an expert's opinion that such conduct violated the standard of care. Even though

Johnson's own affidavit did not directly deny that he groped Hall, his qualified opinion that he
did not violate the standard of care is enough to shift the burden of production to Hall in
summary judgment, because that is how medical malpractice cases proceed under Idaho law.
Further1TIore, the doctors' opinions that they did not violate the standard of care in supervising

their physician's assistant were enough the shift the burden of production in summary judgment
to Hall. Since the only expert opinion produced by Hall in response was found inadmissibk, the
Defendants' affidavits stood unopposed. Thus, summary judgment was proper. Therefore, even

if the Court treated I I all 's Memorandum as a procedurally proper motion, the motion is denied.

III. CONCLUSION
Hall's Memorandum was procedurally improper because there was no motion filed with
the Memorandum. Alternatively, Hall's Memorandum was procedurally improper because it
failed to cik an appropriate rule as grounds for the request. The Court denies Hall's requests to
treat her Memorandum as a proper motion for reconsideration brought under lRCP 11 (a)(2)(B).
Additlonally and alternatively, even if the Court treated Hall's Memorandum as a proper motion
for reconsideration, the motion fails on its merits because summary judgment was proper.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED February 27, 2012.

DAVIDC.NYE
District Judge
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